In this paper, I will focus on the normative structure of tort law. Only by elucidating the point or rationale of holding the wrongdoer responsible to the victim can we understand the value of having tort law instead of establishing other mechanisms of redress, such as a social insurance scheme. Ultimately, I will argue that the value of interpersonal justice, which underlies tort law, might not suffice to fully justify it in a given community. It all depends on whether victims (...) of accidents are able to vindicate their rights against wrongdoers on a regular basis. If social conditions make this unlikely, then the state might be morally required to implement other forms of compensation, either replacing tort law altogether or supplementing it with social insurance in cases where private justice mechanisms tend to fail more dramatically. (shrink)

This paper presents an analysis of the various dimensions of independence and impartiality. Among other things, I will argue that the two concepts, both of which are profoundly implicated in the rule of law, can be conceived as values and are perfectly distinguishable from each other. I will also propose a conception of neutrality, as a third distinct value that satisfies the requirement for non-redundancy with regard to independence and impartiality. Hence, judges and arbitrators must be independent, impartial and neutral. (...) Each of these values contributes in different ways to enabling the law to fulfil its distinctive function of facilitating social interaction in complex and plural societies. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that economic theories have never been able to provide a coherent explanation of the causation requirement in tort law. The economic characterization of this requirement faces insurmountable difficulties, because discourse on tort liability cannot be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis without a loss of meaning. More seriously, I try to show that by describing causation in economic terms, economic theories offer an image of the practice in which the participants incur in logical contradictions and develop (...) patterns of inference that are far from intuitive. For this reason, efficiency cannot be the fundamental principle underlying tort law. Finally, I suggest that economic analysis of law can provide a genuine explanation of certain aspects of legal practice if it relinquishes its reductionist claims. (shrink)

A menudo se piensa que los estándares genéricos de diligencia son una fuente importante de incertidumbre ya que están radicalmente indeterminados. A fin de favorecer la seguridad jurídica, el derecho de daños debería prescindir de ellos tanto como sea posible y optar por ofrecer estándares específicos, redactados en un lenguaje preciso. En este trabajo argumento que los estándares genéricos no están tan indeterminados como usualmente se asume y que, además, cumplen un papel normativo fundamental en la práctica de la responsabilidad (...) civil. (shrink)